![]() ![]() efforts to directly attack senior enemy leaders-from Fidel Castro to Muammar al-Qaddafi to Saddam Hussein to Slobodan Milosevic-have failed. With the single exception of the shootdown of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's aircraft in World War II, all U.S. Direct Attacks, Coups, and Rebellions Have Poor Resultsīecause enemy leaders devote priority attention and abundant resources to the protection of their persons and power, they are hard to kill and overthrow. From this information, he distills policy and operational lessons regarding the comparative efficacy and prerequisites for success of different forms of attack, their potential coercive and deterrent value, and the possible unintended consequences of their ill-considered use. Hosmer analyzes some two dozen cases of attacks on leadership from World War II to the present. ![]() In Operations Against Enemy Leaders, Stephen T. Over the years, the United States has mounted both overt and covert operations to kill enemy leaders directly or to secure their overthrow either by indigenous coup or rebellion or by external invasion and takedown. Operations that threaten the person and power of senior enemy decisionmakers have long been considered to be promising instruments for shortening wars, affecting other changes in enemy policy and behavior, and degrading enemy war-fighting capability.
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